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Contested Subjects of Human Rights: Trans- and
Gender-variant Subjects of International Human
Rights Law
Sandra Duffy∗
Gendered identities and gender variance have become a regular subject of the discourse of the
United Nations human rights protection mechanisms.This article explores the manner in which
gender identities are discussed, constructed, and regulated by the international human rights law
system.Through use of postcolonial and feminist theoretical lenses, it argues that the emergence
of multiple gendered identities into the legal mainstream has required the United Nations hu-
man rights bodies to expand their concepts of gender and to develop a new vocabulary and
jurisprudence of gender variance. The article examines the language used in the construction
of gendered subjects and its relationship to dynamics of state and postcolonial power. It also
introduces the concept of the ‘cisgender matrix’ to international human rights law, expressing
the hierarchical social privilege given to binary, stable gendered identities over gender-variant
ones.
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the United Nations Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity issued a report on the human rights of gender-diverse commu-
nities and persons, stating that, ‘[s]elf-determined gender is a fundamental part
of a person’s free and autonomous choice in relation to roles, feelings, forms
of expression and behaviours, and a cornerstone of the person’s identity.’1 The
Independent Expert was, in this report, giving voice to the growing movement
advocating for the recognition and rights of gender-variant persons. Gender
recognition laws and the auxiliary rights of gender-variant persons have be-
come the subject of intense debate in many domestic jurisdictions,as expanding
conceptions of gendered identity and its permutations reach the arena of the
courts.2 The varying approaches taken by members of the international com-
munity of states pose an additional challenge to the institutions of international
∗Dr Sandra Duffy is Teaching Associate, School of Law, University of Bristol. The author expresses
her thanks to Professor Siobhán Mullally for her support and feedback from the earliest incarnations
of this work, as well as to the reviewers for their constructive and helpful comments.
1 UN Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, ‘Report of the Indepen-
dent Expert on Protection against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity’ (UN General Assembly 2018) A/73/152, para 21.
2 This has not been a universal experience, but it has been prominent in some jurisdictions such
as the media-led reaction to the Gender Recognition Act 2004 in the United Kingdom and in
the ‘gender ideology’ backlash currently being experienced by Eastern European jurisdictions
such as Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria.
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human rights. The disparities of recognition among states have contributed to
the slow uptake of gender identity issues among the Treaty Bodies and Spe-
cial Procedures of the United Nations human rights system; however, since the
adoption of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Principles) in 2007 and their identi-
fication of a comprehensive right to the recognition of gender, the international
human rights law bodies have come to more broadly acknowledge the existence
of gender-diverse identities and the rights of gender-variant persons.However,
this uptake has not been without its problems, some of which form the basis of
the analysis in this article.
Although it is noted most frequently in the context of transgender rights and
identities, gender identity is a universal attribute; across cultures, temporalities,
and spatial horizons, societies create and reiterate concepts of gender roles and
expressions. These categories are shaped by many factors, including culture, re-
ligion, law, language, and sexuality. Gendered identities should be understood
as the set of all identities, both binary-conforming and non-conforming. The
recognition of, or failure to recognise, gender, can be extremely important for
the gender-variant subject in particular. Access to medical, educational, em-
ployment, or social services can be impacted by a failure to present identity
documents which conform to the gender presentation of the individual. The
importance of appropriate gender recognition to the life of every individual
means that its implementation is a pressing human rights concern.As the United
Nations human rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures have begun to be
conversant in the language and practical facets of gender recognition and the
related rights of gender-variant persons, attention has turned to the manner in
which this discourse is enacted, with particular attention to the ways in which
gender-variant persons are constructed and understood as legal actors or as the
subjects of law through such processes. This article will explore the terms in
which gender variance is discussed within the United Nations human rights
system, as well as the frames of references used to construct gendered identities
in international human rights law.
No small amount of commentary exists on the mainstreaming of Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) as a human rights issue. However,
relatively little of this attention has been dedicated to gender diversity in and of
itself, as it is frequently overshadowed by the combined weight and history of
advocacy around non-heterosexual sexual orientations. If gender diversity is not
visible, if it only appears in generalisations or as a subheading of a larger category,
there is no means to represent the nuances of identities.Thus,we continue to see
gender diversity discussed in broad strokes;attention directed to answering what
are believed to be systemic patterns of rights violations rather than the lived
experience of individuals; and the retention of binarist normative attitudes and
language even among those who are attempting to rectify oppressions imposed
by society at large.
This article presents an analysis of the ‘contested terrain’3 of gender-variant
subject formation in international human rights law. Informed by queer,
3 R.Kapur, ‘Human Rights in the 21st Century:Take a Walk on the Dark Side’ (2008) 28 Sydney
Law Review 665.
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post-colonial, feminist, and post-structuralist theories more generally, it dis-
cusses the manner in which international human rights law categorises trans
and gender-variant persons and thereby de/humanises them. This article does
not propose to engage in a deconstruction of the term ‘gender identity’ as used
in international human rights law; rather, it examines the understanding which
the institutions of international human rights law have of the term and of the
persons with whom the term is related. A framework for viewing the manner
in which certain gender identities are privileged above others and therefore are
more likely to be viewed as legitimate subjects of human rights is proposed in
the first part of the article. Secondly, the history of the relationship between
international human rights law and the gendered subject is examined, showing
the growth of the potential subject as prompted by the interventions of feminist
and queer theories to international human rights law.The third part focuses on
the construction of transgender and gender-variant subjects in particular,while
the fourth part elaborates on the problematic elements of the United Nations
bodies’ discourse in relation to these subjects, including pathologisation, hege-
monic protectionism, and normative Westernisation.
This article also explores some of the linguistic and conceptual influences
that emanated from the adoption of the Principles and were adopted into the
practice of international human rights law. It acknowledges the power of inter-
national human rights law in the creation of norms on gender identity, before
moving on to discuss the construction of the gender-variant subject in inter-
national human rights law. In particular, it examines the constitutive language
used to describe and categorise gender variance at the UN Treaty Bodies and
Special Procedures, arguing that the use of a ‘term of inclusion’ may actually
operate in an exclusionary manner when it comes to the most marginalised
gender-diverse communities. The influence of European or North American
discourse on gender variance in the global South is also discussed, and attention
is drawn to the potential neo-colonial harm that can stem from the wholesale
adoption of concepts of ‘sexual orientation and gender identity
GENDER IDENTITY, GENDER MODALITY, AND THE CISGENDER
MATRIX
The generally accepted definition of gender identity in international human
rights law is that given by the 2007 Yogyakarta Principles:
each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may
or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense
of the body (which may involve, if freely chosen,modification of bodily appearance
or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender,
including dress, speech and mannerisms.4
4 Conference of International Legal Scholars, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 6-9 November 2006, Yo-
gyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orien-
tation and Gender Identity (March 2007), Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles.
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Further to this, ‘gender modality’ is the manner in which the individual’s expe-
rience of gender relates to that which was assigned to them at birth: in the main,
cisgender persons experience a gender identity congruent with that assigned at
birth,5 while transgender persons experience a different gender identity from
their assigned gender.6
Gender diversity, as Hines writes, describes persons who ‘[do] not conform
to their society’s norms or values when it comes to their gendered physical-
ity, gender identity, gender expression, or a combination of these factors.’7 In
this article, gender-diverse (for communities) and gender-variant (for individ-
uals) are used to denote persons who identify outside of the cisgender norm
in any way, including those who may not see themselves as falling within the
‘transgender’ paradigm for reasons such as gender fluidity, non-binary identity,
or non-Western cultural identity. In this, these terms seek to be inclusive of
persons who are both within the ‘transgender’ identity category, and outside
or beyond it. The umbrella term ‘trans’ is often used similarly, although more
particularly in relation to Western cultural identities such as transgender, gen-
derqueer, agender, etc.
In their landmark book,Gender Trouble, Butler describes gender as a series of
performative acts – speech, expressions, social interactions, repeated and given
power in that repetition. This power ‘not only acts upon a preexisting sub-
ject but also shapes and forms that subject.’8 The act of inscribing terms for
‘legitimate’ gender identities in law is a binding form of this constitutive act.
Gender, as ‘the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes’9 belies the
theory of biological essentialism – the assumption that social gender roles will
map neatly onto bodies sexed male or female. The ‘gendered matrix’ or the
‘heterosexual matrix,’10 through which sex is read, confers meaning onto the
material body,naming it as one or other category in accordance with the matrix
of intelligibility constructed by our society. This ‘heterosexual matrix’ suggests
that the ‘bodies that make sense are those presented as reflecting a stable sex.’11
This stability is defined ‘through the practice of heterosexuality’: that is to say,
through a system of hierarchical and oppositional binary identities:male/female,
masculine/feminine, straight/gay.12 In terms of theorising gender variance and
the law, it is possible to conceive of a cisgender matrix: a system of intelligibility in
which identities are privileged which perform a binary, stable, mono-identity.
The formulation of human rights standards reflect this preference for bounded,
finite identity categories: the United Nations human rights treaties thus far
incorporate only two gendered subjects (binary male/female), while even the
5 S. Stryker, Transgender History (Berkeley, CA: Seal Press, 2008) 22. Furthermore, see J. Serano,
Whipping Girl (Berkeley, CA: Seal Press, 2016) for contestations on the term ‘cisgender’.
6 F. Ashley, ‘“Trans” is my Gender Modality: A Modest Terminological Proposal’ at
https://www.florenceashley.com/uploads/1/2/4/4/124439164/florence_ashley_trans_is_
my_gender_modality.pdf (last accessed 2 March 2021).
7 S.Hines, Is Gender Fluid?:A Primer for the 21st Century (London:Thames and Hudson, 2018) 16.
8 J. Butler,Undoing Gender (Abingdon: Routledge: 2004) 41.
9 J. Butler,Gender Trouble (Abingdon: Routledge: 1990) 6.
10 ibid, 5.
11 B. Cossman, ‘Gender Performance, Sexual Subjects and International Law’ in D. Otto, Gender
Issues and Human Rights Volume III (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar: 2013) 793.
12 ibid.
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Yogyakarta Principles consider gender identity to be ‘deeply felt,’ thereby im-
plying a unitary, non-fluid part of the individual’s personality.
Congruence with observable sexual characteristics is the lens through which
the cisgender matrix frames its subjects. Those who transgress the binary, go
through gender transition (particularly without medical interventions), or shift
between fluid identities are rendered less or non-intelligible. These identities
are also most frequently those which are rendered invisible in discussions of the
human rights of gender-variant persons, rendering them doubly marginalised.
It is important to note, following Hines’ work, that some trans persons do not
wish to be considered gender-variant; that they inhabit the cisgender matrix
following gender transition without troubling it further in their presentation
or expression.13 However, some trans and gender-variant persons are not, and
do not wish to be, intelligible to the matrix. Even within international human
rights law, those persons often find themselves marginalised and removed from
discourse. This will be further explored in the discussion of the formation of
gendered subjects in international human rights law, below.
Sex characteristics, both primary and secondary, are some of the most basic
indicators from which gender is read. However, the existence of persons with
intersex or variant sex characteristics further destabilises the idea that biology
is destiny, as sex characteristics can be empirically shown not to be universally
dyadic. Persons with intersex variations are often subjected to non-consensual
surgeries, frequently as infants, in order to render their sex characteristics more
congruent with the norm.This insistence on coherence causes irreparable harm
to many people and displays the coercive power of the cisgender matrix on the
lives and bodies of individuals.
The gendered subject, then, to remain intelligible, must display coherent
physical gender-related characteristics, and must physically embody and ma-
terially perform constitutive acts of gender with their own bodily presentation.
As Cabral and Viturro write,
the language of rights for trans persons yields a prescriptive set of demands placed
on trans persons,particularly in corporeal terms,as a requirement for achieving legal
recognition of their gender identities.The affirmation of such rights, predicated on
the demand for such corporeal requirements, creates a diminished ethical-political
status.14
This need for physical congruence is also a factor underpinning the medical di-
agnoses imposed on trans and other gender-variant persons. In many instances,a
medical diagnosis is required for access to legal gender recognition procedures;
some laws mandate particular interventions, often surgical and irreversible.15
Such laws demand the physical construction of a congruent subject before the
13 See S. Hines, Gender Diversity, Recognition and Citizenship: Towards a Politics of Difference (Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 2013).
14 M. Cabral and P. Viturro, ‘(Trans)Sexual Citizens in Contemporary Argentina’ in P. Currah, S.
Minter and R.Juang,Transgender Rights (Minneapolis,MN:University of Minnesota Press,2006).
15 See Z.Chiam, S.Duffy and M.Gonzalez Gil,Trans Legal Mapping Report (Geneva: ILGA World:
2020) for a global survey of gender recognition laws and conditions thereon.
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human right to gender recognition can be accessed. It is evident that, in order
to vindicate the human rights of gender-variant persons, then, the rights-bearer
needs be constructed in a manner which does not rely on the cisgender matrix
for its intelligibility, and which accepts the varying physical and psychological
presentations of diverse genders to be found in communities around the world.
EMERGING GENDERED SUBJECTS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
Accepting that gendered identities are a universal, socially constructed attribute,
this section illustrates how the gender-variant subject is but one of a series
of constructed gendered subjects in international human rights law. Women’s
rights famously became human rights in Beijing in 1995,16 but the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women had
been adopted in 1979,marking the first time that a subject that was specifically
other-than male had had its rights recognised explicitly in a comprehensive
international human rights treaty. In the 1990s and 2000s, the queer subject
became a topic of discussion, with gay and lesbian rights the first to be identi-
fied, and discourse on the rights of ‘LGBT’ subjects proliferated at the United
Nations human rights institutions during the first decades of the twenty-first
century. In more recent times, the United Nations human rights bodies have
seen the terms of discourse pivot away from the monolithic ‘LGBT’ and to-
ward ‘SOGI’ (Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), a phrasing which aims
to broaden the scope of the identities contained thereunder and to move away
from status-based rights claims limited to narrowly-defined identities.
CEDAW and the construction of women
Although the right to formal equality of the two binary sexes was written into
the formative texts of the United Nations itself,17 the Women’s Convention
or the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW; the Convention) was signed only in 1979.Motivated by the
‘failure of existing conventions to take into account the specific human rights
concerns of women,’18 CEDAW was an attempt to create a human rights dis-
course particular to the needs of women.Article 1 of the Convention states that
the term ‘discrimination against women’ includes ‘any distinction, exclusion or
16 ‘If there is one message that echoes forth from this conference, let it be that human rights are
women’s rights and women’s rights are human rights, once and for all.’Hillary Rodham Clinton,
remarks to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 1995.
17 Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations: ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small’; Charter of the United Nations, Article 1: ‘promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.’
18 R. Mandhane, ‘The Use of Human Rights Discourse to Secure Women’s Interests: Critical
Analysis of the Implications’ in Otto (ed), n 11 above, 87.
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restriction made on the basis of sex’ while rights should be enjoyed ‘on a basis
of equality of men and women.’
CEDAW is the first comprehensive United Nations Convention which
places the female subject apart from the universal, presumed-male, subject of
previous Conventions. Until ‘the advent of international human rights law,’ as
Otto writes,
sex/gender in international law was understood as m/f dichotomy…Women were
invariably produced as the dependents,property or extensions of men and therefore
in need of legal ‘protection’rather than legal ‘rights.’Like colonized peoples,women
were considered, by nature, incapable of full autonomy and agency.19
This began to change as feminist activists started to challenge the rhetoric and
philosophy of protectionism, citing their ability to be actors under the law
with agency and autonomy as people. However, this was a challenge to the
male/female binary as hierarchy – the supremacy of men over women – rather
than the duality itself.20 Moreover, the majority of ‘third world’ women are
still often constructed in scholarship as automatic victims incapable of agency, a
lasting mischaracterisation which has not been eradicated by the rise of global
women’s human rights law.21
The advent of women’s rights as a field ensured that there were now two
gendered subjects in international human rights law,albeit two subjects in a pre-
sumed asymmetrical hierarchy. Rosenblum has challenged CEDAW’s reliance
on this strict gender binary on several grounds, among them being the uncer-
tainty of ‘women’as a discrete category.22 The existence and knowledge of mul-
tiple gender identities means that a clear binary split between men and women
is no longer a defensible basis for comparison. Indeed,Otto reads CEDAW itself
as open to an interpretation which validates social gender identities, as seen in
the Introduction and Article 2(f),which both refer to gender roles and customs
and practice as social constructions which must be changed in order to create
meaningful equality between men and women. Article 2(f) places an obliga-
tion on states parties to actively work against discrimination based on these
social roles and practices.23 Although these passages do not themselves disrupt
the sex binary, they form a clear acknowledgement that ‘men’ and ‘women’ are
identities which have, and are governed by, social roles rather than being purely
biologically based. Holtmaat refers to the Article 5 CEDAW recognition of
19 D. Otto, ‘International Human Rights Law: Towards Rethinking Sex/Gender Dualism and
Asymmetry’ in M.Davies and V.Munro (eds),The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal
Theory (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) 5.
20 Otto, ibid; also D.Otto, ‘Queering Gender [Identity] in International Human Rights Law’ (2015)
33 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 299.
21 See C. Talpade Mohanty, ‘Under Western Eyes’ in C. Talpade Mohanty, A. Russo and L. Torres
(eds),Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press
1991).
22 D. Rosenblum, ‘Unsex CEDAW, or What’s Wrong with Women’s Rights’ in Otto (ed), n 11
above.
23 Otto, ‘Queering Gender [Identity]’ n 20 above, 303.
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‘social roles’ as the basis for CEDAW’s potential for ‘transformative equality,’24
allowing for subjectivities beyond ‘male’ and ‘female’ to be recognised.
A myriad of genders: the emergence of queer and gender-variant identities
in IHRL
A shift away from binary sex as the means of categorisation allows for the pos-
sibility of further gendered identities asserting themselves as subjects within
international human rights law. As sexuality in the fundamental human rights
Conventions is primarily located within a heteronormative family structure,25
the case of Toonen v Australia in 1994,26 wherein the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee ruled that the prohibition of discrimination based on sex in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also applied to sexual orientation
and same-sex sexual behaviour, was a radical affirmation of the rights of queer
subjects. Toonen was the first juridical recognition of gay rights on the level of
international human rights law.27 1994 also saw the first recognition of sexual
and sexuality rights at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna and
the UN Cairo Conference on Population and Development.28
Sexuality had, therefore, been a subject of discourse for some time before
gender identity came to the attention of the United Nations human rights
bodies as a characteristic in its own right.The earliest reference to gender vari-
ance from the Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures came in the 2001 Report
to the General Assembly from the Special Rapporteur on Torture, wherein he
noted that many ‘sexual minorities’ experience sexual violence in detention
and in encounters with law enforcement ‘in order to “punish” them for trans-
gressing gender barriers or for challenging predominant conceptions of gender
roles.’ The Rapporteur went on to write that
… it appears that members of sexual minorities are disproportionately subjected
to torture and other forms of ill-treatment, because they fail to conform to so-
cially constructed gender expectations. Indeed, discrimination on the grounds of
sexual orientation or gender identity may often contribute to the process of the
dehumanization of the victim,which is often a necessary condition for torture and
ill-treatment to take place.29
24 R. Holtmaat, ‘The CEDAW: a Holistic Approach to Women’s Equality and Freedom’ in A.
Hellum and H. Sinding Aasen (eds),Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, Regional
and National Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 95.
25 M.Waites, ‘Critique of ‘sexual orientation’and ‘gender identity’ in human rights discourse:global
queer politics beyond the Yogyakarta Principles’ (2009) 15 Contemporary Politics 137, 139-140.
26 Toonen v Australia [1994] UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 488/1992.
27 S. Joseph, ‘Gay Rights Under the ICCPR: Commentary on Toonen v Australia’ (1994) 13 Uni-
versity of Tasmania Law Review 392, 410.
28 J. McGill, ‘SOGI … So What? Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Human Rights Dis-
course at the United Nations’ (2014) 3 Canadian Journal of Human Rights 1, 10.
29 UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, ‘Question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment’Report to the General Assembly (2001) A/56/156, 17 and following.
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The first citation of gender identity before the Human Rights Council oc-
curred in the Joint Statement on Human Rights Violations based on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity, in 2006.30 This was followed in 2008 by the
first citation of gender identity before the General Assembly, in the Statement
on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity.31 The Statement
included an acknowledgement ‘that human rights apply equally to every human
being regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity,’ along with concern
over violence, discrimination, and prejudice, over the vulnerability to torture
and arbitrary arrest of gender-variant and queer persons, and of deprivation of
economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health. The State-
ment also includes the provision that ‘sexual orientation or gender identity may
under no circumstances be the basis for criminal penalties, in particular execu-
tions, arrests or detention.’The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is cited
in the Statement, relating the protection of rights regarding sexual orientation
and gender identity to the foundational principles of international human rights
law.
The Yogyakarta Principles and queering IHRL
References to sexual orientation and/or gender identity were rare in the pub-
lications of the Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures before the signing of the
Yogyakarta Principles in 2007.32 The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application
of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexuality and Gender Iden-
tity33 are a non-binding but highly influential document drafted by an interna-
tional group of academics, experts, and human rights leaders.34 The Principles,
along with the 2017 addition of the YP+10 document, are considered the most
comprehensive document on the human rights of queer and gender-variant
subjects. They are particularly notable for their attention to gender variance, as
is visible in their definition of gender identity, previously cited.
Waites notes that this attention was the express result of the two transgender-
identified authors in the drafting process, Mauro Cabral and Stephen Whittle,
working through the necessary balance between juridical legibility and inclu-
sive representation.35 ‘Gender identity’, although potentially a more restrictive
category than they would have preferred, was useful as a companion term to
‘sexual orientation’; however, the use of ‘expressions of gender’ rendered the
30 Joint Statement on Human Rights Violations based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,
3rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 1 December 2006.
31 Joint Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, General Assembly,
18 December 2008.
32 Examples: Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, country visit to
Colombia, 2002, E/CN.4/2002/106/Add.2; Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 2004,
E/CN.4/2004/49.
33 n 4 above.
34 M. O’Flaherty and J. Fisher, ‘Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human
Rights Law:Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 207.
35 Waites, n 25 above, 148.
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statement more inclusive of all the ways in which gender diversity manifests it-
self.However, this definition may still be viewed as exclusionary on the grounds
of describing gender identity as an ‘inherent characteristic – both innate and
unitary,’36 which ‘excludes those who experience their gender as shifting or
multiple, as well as those who identify as some combination or blurring of
male and female.’ In the YP+10 document, gender expression is itself defined
as:
each person’s presentation of the person’s gender through physical appearance –
including dress, hairstyles, accessories, cosmetics – and mannerisms, speech, be-
havioural patterns, names and personal references, and noting further that gender
expression may or may not conform to a person’s gender identity.37
An additional comment is added stating that ‘all references to gender identity
should be understood to be inclusive of gender expression as a ground for pro-
tection,’ as well as defining sex characteristics as: ‘each person’s physical features
relating to sex, including genitalia and other sexual and reproductive anatomy,
chromosomes, hormones, and secondary physical features emerging from pu-
berty.’38
Furthermore, it cited sex characteristics as a prohibited ground for discrim-
ination,meaning that persons with intersex variations or other non-normative
sexual characteristics cannot be subjected to ill-treatment based on their physi-
cal characteristics.These references, particularly those to gender expression and
to the non-dyadic forms of sexual characteristics, help to disrupt the operation
of the cisgender matrix by complicating the elements of an individual’s gender
identity. However, as yet their influence has not extended to the gender dis-
course of international human rights law, which continues to privilege stable
expressions of sexuality and gender identity even as it purports to become more
open on the subject.
Following the publication of the Yogyakarta Principles, issues around sex-
ual orientation and gender identity began to appear more frequently in the
discourse of international human rights law.39 An immediate result was the ci-
tation of the Principles multiple times during the first sessions of the Universal
Periodic Review, beginning in 2008. 2008 also saw the first year in which the
Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures approached gender identity as its own
concern: for example, the first Human Rights Committee (CCPR) citation
of gender identity occurred in its 2008 review of Ireland.40 The review noted
Ireland’s lack of a legal gender recognition procedure, and recommended that
one be implemented. The Committee Against Torture also first addressed the
vulnerability of gender-variant persons to ill-treatment in 2008, in its review of
36 Otto, ‘Queering Gender [Identity]’ n 20 above, 313.
37 Preamble to the Yogyakarta Principles +10, 2017.
38 ibid.Note that this primarily emerged from the inclusion of intersex activist Morgan Carpenter
in the YP+10 drafting process.
39 See M. O’Flaherty, ‘The Yogyakarta Principles at 10’ (2015) 33 Nordic Journal of Human Rights
280, for extensive recounting of the impact of the Principles at regional and international level.
40 Human Rights Committee,Concluding Observations on Ireland,2008,CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3.
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Latvia.41 Similarly, in the same year, the Committee on the Rights of the Child
commented on the vulnerability of gender-variant children within the United
Kingdom.42 The work of human rights NGOs was also vital in continuing to
keep issues of sexual rights and gender identity alive at the Treaty Bodies and
Special Procedures.As Correa et al state, ‘the treaty bodies have rendered dozens
of comments and reports recognizing the obligations of states to respect sexual
and reproductive rights.’43
In 2011, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights was man-
dated to report on human rights violations based on sexual orientation and
gender identity by the General Assembly.44 In this report,45 once more, the
protection of persons of non-normative sexuality and gender identity is stated
to be ‘guided by the principles of universality and non-discrimination.’46 Sex-
ual orientation and gender identity are compared to ‘disability, age and health
status,’ as characteristics which are protected under ‘other status’ provisions in
the Conventions.47 Although most of the report deals with violations based
on sexual orientation, or sexual orientation and gender identity as a bloc, the
report does dedicate a section to gender recognition and related issues, includ-
ing the necessity of sterilisation and/or divorce for applicants for legal gender
recognition in many jurisdictions.48
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights published a
follow-up report on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gen-
der identity in 2015,49 noting developments in the legal and policy systems of
UN Member States in the four years since the previous Report. It noted that,
14 States have adopted or strengthened anti-discrimination and hate crime laws,
extending protection on grounds of sexual orientation and/or gender identity and,
in two cases, also introducing legal protections for intersex persons … and 10 have
introduced reforms that, to varying degrees, make it easier for transgender persons
to obtain legal recognition of their gender identity.50
Furthermore,it notes the particular vulnerability of gender-variant persons with
regard to access to healthcare and autonomy in healthcare decisions.51
41 Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on Latvia, 2008, A/63/44, 19.
42 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom,
2008, CRC/C/GBR/CO/4
43 S. Corrêa, R. Petchesky and R. Parker, ‘Sexual Rights within the UN’ in Sexuality, Health and
Human Rights (London,New York,NY:Routledge 2008) 172.
44 Resolution 17/19 on Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity;
A/HRC/RES/17/19.
45 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Discriminatory Laws and Practices and
Acts of Violence against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’
(UN General Assembly 2011) A/HRC/19/41.
46 ibid, para 5.
47 ibid, para 7.
48 ibid, para 72.
49 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Update of Report A/HRC/19/41 (on
Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence against Individuals Based on Their
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity)’ (UN Human Rights Council 2015) A/HRC/29/23,
pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 27/32.
50 ibid, para 3.
51 ibid, para 54.
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The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also created the
Free and Equal campaign, dedicated to the promotion of the human rights
of gender-variant persons and those of non-heteronormative sexualities. The
campaign has produced two reports, 2011’s Born Free and Equal, and 2015’s
Living Free and Equal. In 2016, the mandate of the Independent Expert on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity was established. The mandate has re-
leased several reports during the tenure of its first two holders, including its
most recent, July 2019, report which,
examines how discriminatory laws and sociocultural norms continue to marginal-
ize and exclude lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and gender-diverse persons from ed-
ucation, health care, housing, employment and occupation, and other sectors …
[and] looks at the inclusion and access to these rights through the lens of intersec-
tionality and analyses compounded discrimination, which leads to exclusion and
marginalization.52
With regard to gender variance, however, its most relevant publication is the
July 2018 report to the UN General Assembly, which ‘examines the process of
abandoning the classification of certain forms of gender as a pathology and the
full scope of the duty of the State to respect and promote respect of gender
recognition as a component of identity.’53 This report is worth examining in
some detail, as it is the clearest statement of the rights and societal position of
gender-variant persons in all of the United Nations’ jurisprudence and publica-
tions. It uses the Yogyakarta Principles definition of gender identity, as extracted
above, as well as ‘tak[ing] into account the distinct life experience of individu-
als based on the interlinkage of their gender identity with other factors, such as
race, ethnicity,migrant status, education and economic status’54 to form a com-
plete picture of the lives of gender-variant individuals. It also acknowledges
the breadth of culturally-specific gender identities across the globe, ‘including
hijra (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan), travesti (Argentina and Brazil), waria (In-
donesia), okule and agule (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda),
muxe (Mexico), fa’afafine (Samoa), kathoey (Thailand) and two-spirit (indigenous
North Americans).’55
The Report acknowledges the oppression of the gender-variant individual
by unofficial regimes of power such as culture, religion, and tradition56 before
going on to explore the deep pathologisation of gender-diverse communities.
It recognises trans and gender-variant persons as legal subjects and actors, who
should be allowed to make a free and autonomous choice of their gender iden-
tity and expression.57 It also addresses the obligation of States to provide le-
gal recognition of trans persons’ gender, stating that, ‘lack of legal recognition
52 UN Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,Report of the Independent
Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity, UN General Assembly, A/74/181, 17 July 2019.
53 UN Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, n 1 above.
54 ibid, para 2.
55 ibid, para 3.
56 ibid, para 7.
57 ibid, para 21.
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negates the identity of the concerned persons to such an extent that it provokes
what can be described as a fundamental rupture of State obligations.’58
Continuing on the theme of conflict between the laws of a State and its
gender-diverse communities, the report addresses the criminalisation, de facto
and de jure, of variant gender expression, and goes on to discuss the abusive
requirements put in place by some States for access to legal gender recognition
procedures, including
forced, coerced or otherwise involuntary sterilization; medical procedures related
to transition, including surgeries and hormonal therapies; undergoing medical di-
agnosis, psychological appraisals or other medical procedures or treatment; as well
as third-party consent for adults, forced divorce and age-of-offspring restrictions.59
The Independent Expert also refers to the European Court of Human Rights
judgment in A.P.,Garcon, and Nicot v France,60 which required that sterilisation
requirements be removed from the gender recognition laws of Council of Eu-
rope Member States61 and the case of G v Australia62 before the UN Human
Rights Council,wherein it was held that a transgender woman’s rights had been
breached when she was forced by Australian law to choose between preserv-
ing her marriage and having her gender legally recognised. Furthermore, the
Report states the legal gender recognition conditions it believes to be human-
rights compliant.63
This Report lays out a comprehensive statement of the rights of gender-
variant legal subjects and the obligations of States in their regard. It is the first
publication of a United Nations Special Procedure – or indeed, Treaty Body –
to do so. In so doing, it has set out a clear position which will inform its future
interactions with, and assessment of, States Parties.
CONSTRUCTING THE GENDER-VARIANT SUBJECT IN IHRL
This section examines the construction of the gender-variant subject in inter-
national human rights law with reference to the jurisprudence and outcomes of
the United Nations Treaty Bodies, Special Procedures, and Universal Periodic
Review process. This material is invaluable in tracking the genesis and progress
of international human rights norms, and their effects on domestic and regional
legal systems – whether through direct effect, such as a finding against a State
Party to a Convention by a Treaty Body, or by the formation of regulatory
norms which influence law-making in Member States.This history is intended
58 ibid, para 23.
59 ibid, para 28.
60 A.P.,Garcon and Nicot v France Applications Nos 79885/12, 52471/13 and 52596/13, European
Court of Human Rights, 6 April 2017 at [131] and [135].
61 UN Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, n 1 above.
62 UN Human Rights Committee, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5(4) of the
Optional Protocol, concerning communication No 2172/2012,CCPR/C/119/D/2172/2012,
28 June 2017.
63 UN Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, n 1 above.
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to serve as both a record of the interactions of the international human rights
bodies with gender identity and gender variance, and a critical assessment of
the manner in which this takes place.
In examining the ways in which variant gender identity is represented and
interacted with in the international human rights system, there are two strands
of analysis which are inescapably intertwined: the formation of the subject of
human rights law, and the formation of legal or sociolegal norms. In setting out
parameters by which States should regulate their legal practice in order to ensure
the human rights of their citizens, the United Nations bodies create a normative
legal regime; at the same time,however, the assigning of human rights to certain
subjects creates those subjects as humans – and excludes as non-human those
who are not granted rights. The construction of gender-variant subjects in
international human rights law becomes constitutive of those identities that
will be legible as rights-bearers to State governments and policy-makers.As the
meanings of gender-variant subjects before the UN Treaty Bodies and Special
Procedures evolve, therefore, they create moments of inclusion and exclusion
for gender-variant persons, some of whom will be recognised as legitimate
bearers of human rights and some of whom will be relegated to the liminal
spaces beyond the definitions of the law.
Terms of inclusion: language and the subject
The linguistic categories into which subjects are placed have real consequences
in terms of which subjects are considered legitimate and read as rights-bearers
by human rights policy-makers and State governments. Because the way the
gender-variant subject is formed in legal discourse is constitutive of the legal
personhood of that subject, the language used to describe and delimit it is of
crucial importance in the legitimacy and legibility of the subject.64 Equally, ev-
ery act of constitution of identity is simultaneously an act of exclusion of those
who do not fall within the given standards:male/female, cisgender/transgender,
binary/non-binary. ‘The construction of these dualisms,’ writes Dreyfus, ‘en-
ables international human rights law to identify an implicit ‘standard’ against
which to measure discrimination and other breaches of human rights.’65
Gender diversity is represented most often in discourse under the umbrella
term SOGI, or Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.66 SOGI has become
the internationally assumed ‘term of inclusion;’ ‘the discursive category through
which sexual and gender diversity is being introduced, interpreted, and regu-
lated in the UN forum,’67 replacing the more limited ‘LGBT,’ or Lesbian, Gay,
64 See discussion of the work of Judith Butler on intelligibility, above.
65 T. Dreyfus, ‘The “Half-Invention” of Gender Identity in International Human Rights Law’
(2012) 37 Australian Feminist Law Journal 33, 37.
66 See for example:D.Brown,‘Making Room for Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Inter-
national Human Rights Law: An Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles’ (2009) 31 Michigan
Journal of International Law 821;O’Flaherty and Fisher, n 34 above;United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Born Free and Equal: Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity in International Human Rights Law’ (2012).
67 McGill, n 28 above, 21.
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Bisexual, and Transgender. In the existing scholarship on the use of the term
SOGI,and its component part, ‘gender identity,’ repeat reference is made to Ka-
pur’s description of human rights as contested terrain,68 and how the meaning
of SOGI itself, its use and its categorisation, are equally contested terrain.
The popularisation of ‘SOGI’ denotes dissatisfaction with the rigid and po-
tentially exclusionary identity categories presented by ‘LGBT’. ‘LGBT’assumes
familiarity and identification with identity groups formulated among Anglo-
phone, Eurocentric cultural referents. This carries with it twin risks: that of
alienation of persons from different cultural backgrounds, or those who claim
identities indigenous to their religious or demographic background; and that of
the imposition of Western norms on societies which may still be in the process
of decolonisation.69 In particular, the use of the term ‘transgender’ is problem-
atic, as it signifies a particular paradigm for the origination of the subject in
question. The Anglophone understanding of ‘transgender’ implies a narrative
of passage from one binary gender to another.This implies a boundary,between
two genders; a male/female duality and a subject who has transitioned from an
identifiable A to an equally identifiable B. As a category, it is sometimes re-
jected by persons of non-binary identification, as their lives, not corresponding
to male or female,may not fit within its boundaries.70 Furthermore, persons of
culturally specific gender identities can find that ‘transgender’ does not com-
prehend their experiences or their particular expressions of gender. Lastly, the
neat divisions drawn between identities – the L, G, B, and T – does not allow
for the blurring of identities for persons who experience sexuality and gender
identity as fluid or intertwined, a factor which again most often affects persons
of non-Western, non-normative gender identities most prevalent in the global
South.71
The shift away from LGBT and toward SOGI was intended to ameliorate
some of these difficulties;however, it has itself attracted criticism.The construc-
tion of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ as unitary, monolithic cate-
gories privileges binary modes of gender and expressions of sexuality which are
themselves unitary. It does not allow for the fluidity and multiplicity of genders
and sexualities that exist. Therefore, as Waites writes, SOGI does not so much
give us a new way to regard gender and sexuality so much as it reconfigures the
heterosexual matrix, creating an ‘emergent grid of intelligibility [which] con-
tinues to be subject to dominant [normative] interpretations.’72 This cisgender
matrix, therefore, continues to privilege certain subjects under the category of
68 See Kapur, n 3 above.
69 ‘Western’ is used here in a similar manner to Mohanty’s usage in ‘Under Western Eyes’: ‘attempt-
ing to draw attention to the similar effects of various textual strategies used by writers which
codify Others as non-Western and hence themselves as (implicitly) Western.’ Talpade Mohanty,
n 21 above, 52.
70 On non-binary identities, see C.Richards,M.J. Barker, and W.P. Bouman (eds),Genderqueer and
Non-Binary Genders (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
71 On these cultural identities, see for example S.Woltmann, ‘Third Gender Politics:Hijra Identity
Construction in India and Beyond’ (2020) 41 South Asian Review 3;N.Besnier and K.Alexeyeff
(eds),Gender on the Edge: Transgender,Gay, and Other Pacific Islanders (Honolulu,HI:University of
Hawaii Press, 2014).
72 Waites, n 25 above, 138.
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‘SOGI,’ while others are excluded.McGill adds that SOGI, the discursive cat-
egory through which gender variance is constituted, is ‘often relied on as a
largely coherent global descriptor, but carries specificities of time and place and
assumptions on inclusion.’73 She cites three main criticisms of the manner in
which SOGI is constructed and utilised: the marginalisation of gender variance;
the privileging of Western identity concepts, and the fragmented results which
can come from adding ‘SOGI issues’ to existing human rights framework and
in particular, to the dominant treatment of sexual orientation in international
human rights law.
‘LGBT’ itself maintains an influence on the way the UN institutions view
gender variance, as can be seen in their concentration on transgender subjects
– usually binary-identified and non-fluid transgender persons, in the Western
model – in discourse around these issues. The exclusion of non-binary, gen-
derfluid, agender, and non-Western cultural identities from the discourse con-
tributes to their marginalisation and risks reinforcing the coercive force of the
cisgender matrix.While this article wishes to be as inclusive as possible, it is dif-
ficult to find examples of these more marginalised gender-variant identities in
UN publications, and therefore many of the examples in the following analysis
concentrate on transgender persons.
CONSTRUCTED AND EXCLUDED SUBJECTS
In order to problematise the manner in which the international human rights
system encounters gender-variant subjects, it is necessary to look for the silences;
to look for the exclusions produced by law’s regulatory force. The differential
production of subjects means that every act of inclusion also creates an exclu-
sion; as previously mentioned,McGill cites several difficulties with using SOGI
as a term of inclusion, among which are the risk of ‘losing’ gender identity by
having it subsumed into a category which foregrounds issues of sexual orien-
tation, and the creeping Westernisation of international legal norms on gender
and sexuality.74 This section explores each of these concerns, asking how the
law meets gender-variant subjects and whether its approach should take into
consideration more the silences produced thereby.
Protectionism and the hegemonic victim-subject
Analysis of the practice and jurisprudence of the UN Treaty Bodies and
Special Procedures shows that among their main concerns with regard to the
‘SOGI-related’ category of issues are discrimination and stigma based on gen-
der diversity.Discrimination is seen as a cause for concern both in and of itself,
and as a root cause which leads to the risk of violence against gender-variant
persons. The first Report from the mandate of the Independent Expert on
73 McGill, n 28 above, 21.
74 See McGill, ibid.
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity addressed violence and discrimination
against gender- and sexuality-based minority groups, stating that ‘violence and
discrimination often appear not as singular events but as part of a prolonged vi-
cious circle.They are multiple and multiplied – inextricably linked emotionally,
psychologically, physically and structurally.’75 Both stem from the same struc-
tural causes in society: stigma around gender nonconformity, lack of education
regarding diversity, socioeconomic marginalisation, and intersectional oppres-
sions wherein an individual falls into multiple categories of disadvantage (for
example, gender variance and race, disability, citizenship status). Homophobia-
and transphobia-related crimes of violence are seen as a consequence of the
discriminatory and stigmatising attitudes of society as a whole; a tangible man-
ifestation of the alienation suffered by sexuality- and gender-based minorities.
Non-normative gender expression is a factor which increases vulnerability
to individual attacks and killings, to hate speech, threats, and hate-motivated
assaults, and to victimisation by state actors. This approach means that the right
to non-discrimination is considered to be almost a condition precedent to the
rights to bodily autonomy, to dignity, to freedom of speech and association, etc.
The presence of intersectional forms of discrimination is also often high-
lighted, particularly by the more specialised mandates, as seen in the CEDAW
Committee’s 2017 Concluding Observations on Ukraine.76 Here, also, the
malfeasance and inaction of law enforcement and medical professionals are cited
as aggravating factors in the mistreatment of transgender women and transfem-
inine persons.77
Of course, it is not argued that trans and gender-variant persons do not suf-
fer from discrimination, stigma, and the violence which is the largely inevitable
end result of this societal marginalisation; non-normative gender expression is
a factor that increases vulnerability to individual attacks and killings, to hate
speech, threats, and hate-motivated assaults, and to victimisation by state ac-
tors. Furthermore, a legal climate in which discrimination is legitimised renders
gender-variant existence more difficult, both because of the risk of criminali-
sation for self-expression and because retention of such laws is a clear marker
that the State considers some forms of marginalisation of its gender-diverse
citizens to be legitimate – thereby lending support to discriminatory attitudes
among the public at large.78 Juang sums up the importance of recognition, ‘by
the consequences of its absence: an unvalued person readily becomes a target
or a scapegoat for the hatred of others and begins to see himself or herself only
through the lens of such hatred.’79
75 Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity (2017) A/HRC/35/36, para 39.
76 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations on Ukraine (2017) CEDAW/C/UKR/8.
77 See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2001) A/56/156 wherein the Rappor-
teur discusses the torture of sexuality- and gender-based minorities by law enforcement.
78 See also Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee to Kuwait (2011)
CCPR/C/KWT/CO/2, which comments on the criminalisation of ‘imitating the opposite
sex’ in the State.
79 R.M. Juang, ‘Transgendering the Politics of Recognition’ in Currah,Minter and Juang (eds), n
14 above, 242.
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Rather, it is argued that the concentration of the institutions of international
human rights law on this violence and discrimination risks configuring – in
fact, does configure, the gender-variant person as what Kapur terms the ‘hege-
monic victim-subject.’80 Although Kapur is writing in the context of narratives
of violence against women, it is possible to map the concept across to queer and
gender-variant subjects also. In constructing a subject solely through reference
to the hardships they particularly suffer, international human rights law risks
forming an exclusionary picture of gender-variant subjects, defined by having
experienced a certain kind of discrimination and/or stigma; conversely, there-
fore, delegitimising those subjects who do not fit this formula. Furthermore, if
the gender-variant subject is constituted as a liminal, marginalised, figure, they
are seen as victims rather than as rights-bearers, increasing their alienation from
the law.
Another example of this constructionist rhetoric is seen in the CEDAW
Committee’s 2019 Concluding Observations on Colombia, wherein they state
that:
The Committee is concerned about reports of widespread discrimination, threats
and attacks directed against lesbian, bisexual and transgender women. The Com-
mittee is further concerned that, despite the fact that the Constitutional Court has
ordered the legal recognition of same-sex marriages, lesbian, bisexual and transgen-
der women continue to face unjustified delays, discriminatory interpretations and
unforeseen requirements when exercising their rights.81
Queer and transgender women are portrayed as the victims of ‘discrimination,
threats and attacks.’ Furthermore, they are treated as a monolith who are at-
tempting to exercise rights despite this – but the needs of queer women, and
the needs of transgender women, are often very different. Gender-variant per-
sons may be affected by issues such as a lack of marriage equality in a jurisdic-
tion,but often their more immediate concerns are related to healthcare access82
or to protection for marginalised occupations such as sex work or entertain-
ment. Lastly, ‘transgender,’ as previously discussed, is not an identity shared by
all gender-variant persons in the global South, and it may not be applicable for
many of the most marginalised gender-variant persons in Colombia.83
80 R. Kapur, ‘The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics’ (2002) 15 Harv Hum Rts J 1
81 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations on Colombia (2019) CEDAW/C/COL/9.
82 See C.Dietz, ‘Jurisdiction in Trans Health’ (2020) 47 Journal of Law and Society 60 on the acces-
sibility of trans-related healthcare.
83 This attention to transgender women to the exclusion of other gender identities is also seen in
the medical field, for example R.A.Aguayo-Romero and others, ‘Gender Affirmation and Body
Modification Among Transgender Persons in Bogotá, Colombia’ (2015) 16 International Journal
of Transgenderism 103.
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Pathologisation and biological essentialism
Pathologisation is frequently a central concern in the lives of gender-variant
persons. From medicalised requirements to access legal gender recognition, to
requirements for psychiatric diagnosis before a person can access transition-
related surgical or hormonal interventions,many aspects of life are governed by
medical prerequisites. It is not surprising that medical issues feature prominently
in the discourse of the UN human rights bodies when discussing gender diver-
sity, as interactions between gender-variant persons and medical institutions are
frequent sites of human rights abuses.However, international human rights law
itself can also be a site of further entrenched pathologisation, and it is argued
that an underlying biological essentialism renders it difficult for international
human rights law to effectively vindicate the rights of gender-variant subjects.
Although the psychiatric Diagnostic and Statistical Manual and the World
Health Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases have both moved
toward depathologisation of gender-variant identity, removing it from classi-
fication as a disorder, many United Nations Member States continue to add
medical requirements to their conditions for legal gender recognition. In Eu-
rope, the European Court of Human Rights, in A.P,Garcon,and Nicot v France,84
held that permanent sterilisation could no longer be a requirement for having
one’s gender legally recognised.85 In its reasoning, the European Court found
that obliging trans and gender-variant persons to undergo sterilisation or other
permanent physical changes before accessing legal gender recognition placed
them in the impossible position of attempting to choose between their physical
integrity and their true identity.86 However, it is still legal to require that a per-
son undergo psychiatric evaluation to establish the veracity of their identity. In
2017, the Human Rights Committee commented on Australia’s medicolegal
requirements related to gender transition and gender recognition, noting that
Family Court authorisation was required before young people diagnosed with
gender dysphoria could access hormonal treatment. The HRC expressed con-
cern that this could be harmful to the young people in question with regard to
the efficacy of the treatments and the potential damage to mental health caused
by a delay in beginning medical treatment. It also cited potential breaches of
Articles 7, 17, and 26 of the ICCPR (on torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment, privacy, and non-discrimination, respectively) owing to the require-
ment that most Australian states and territories required compulsory medical
treatment to be undergone before legal gender recognition can be accessed.87
Furthermore,General Comment 22 of the Committee on Economic,Social,
and Cultural Rights is explicitly supportive of the right to accessible and re-
spectful health care for gender-variant persons. It notes that ‘States must reform
laws that impede the exercise of the right to sexual and reproductive health.Ex-
amples include laws criminalizing abortion,HIV non-disclosure, exposure and
84 AP,Garcon, and Nicot v France n 60 above.
85 ibid at [135].
86 ibid at [131].
87 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Australia (2017)
CCPR/C/AUS/CO/6.
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transmission, consensual sexual activities between adults or transgender iden-
tity or expression.’88 In stating that the criminalisation of non-normative gender
identity or expression is a known barrier to access to healthcare, the CESCR
Committee makes explicit the relationship between stigma, pathologisation,
and the pro-active right to health. The manner in which it is stated, which
prioritises the desire of the person in question to surmount those barriers in
order to exercise the right, is both attentive to the needs of the community
and a reflection of the gender-variant subject as rights-bearer, as opposed to
the passive object of mistreatment. The Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights has also recently noted the absence of legal gender recognition
mechanisms as a factor in rendering healthcare inaccessible for gender-variant
persons,89 and specifically cited ‘transgender’/gender-variant status as a factor
increasing vulnerability in a failing healthcare system.90
However, scholars have cited criticisms of the United Nations’ and interna-
tional human rights law’s approach to medical interventions and pathologised
status among gender-diverse communities.O’Brien,writing on intersex rights,
cites the intractable binary91 at the heart of international human rights law as
a stumbling block to achieving equality. By retaining a naturalised sex binary
in human rights law, she argues, it is impossible to imagine bodies which are
not sexed binary male or female. The gender-variant body, transgressing these
boundaries, is also rendered unreal, existing outside the regulatory regime. At
no point has a United Nations Human Rights body commented on the effects
of pathologisation or medicalised requirements for gender recognition on the
growing number of persons identifying outside of the male/female binary.
O’Brien also argues that attempts to secure rights for persons with non-
normative bodies risks embedding difference – creating a subject which is
medicalised by default and subject to further protectionist discourse as a victim
Other.
Bodies with transgender or intersex characteristics that are forcibly ‘sexed’ are seen
to accrue intelligibility only by virtue of surgical, chemical and psychological ma-
nipulations … Technologies of power demonstrate a paranoid need to efface all
traces of sexed ambiguity.92
88 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment No 22 (2016)
on the right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), para 40.
89 Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,Concluding Observations on Costa Rica
(2016) E/C.12/CRI/CO/5.
90 Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,Concluding Observations on Kyrgyzstan
(2015) E/C.12/KGZ/CO/2-3.
91 W.O’Brien, ‘Can International Human Rights Law Accommodate Bodily Diversity?’ (2015) 15
Human Rights Law Review 1, 4.
92 O’Brien, ibid, 15.
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Disaggregating SO + GI
The archives of ‘SOGI’ and ‘LGBT’ jurisprudence among the United Nations
Treaty Bodies display an inconsistent attitude toward gender identity. Gender
identity is a more recent concern of discourse at the United Nations level than
sexual orientation,which as a category of rights-claim and a characteristic par-
ticular to a community, has been an established part of UN jurisprudence since
the 1994 decision of the Human Rights Committee in Toonen v Australia.93
Gender identity, as has been shown in the second section above did not be-
gin receiving mainstream attention until a decade or more following this, and
has therefore somewhat lagged behind in terms of consideration and inclu-
sion. There remains a risk that gender identity, or more accurately, the rights
claims of gender-variant persons,will be subsumed into the larger category and
thereby, intentionally or accidentally, disregarded. As McGill states, ‘[t]reating
“SO” and “GI” as a unified discursive category poses a significant risk that
trans people and human rights issues related to gender identity and expression
will simply disappear from human rights discourse, or be included only as an
afterthought.’94 This is a question of exclusions; of who is silenced and omitted
from discussion.95
Many examples of the sidelining of the rights of gender-variant persons are
visible in the practice of the Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures.The Human
Rights Committee’s 2014 review of Japan cites its concern at ‘discrimination
against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons in employment, housing,
social security,health care,education and other fields regulated by law’;however,
the recommendation stemming from this cites only ‘amending its legislation,
with a view to including sexual orientation among the prohibited grounds
of discrimination, and ensure that benefits granted to unmarried cohabiting
opposite-sex couples are equally granted to unmarried cohabiting same-sex
couples.’96
In this example, although the word ‘transgender’was used in the observation
and recommendation, the effect was to advise the State Party to take measures
that would principally benefit the situations of non-heterosexual persons rather
than those with non-normative gender identities. The citation of gender iden-
tity as a characteristic is a positive development, but unless accompanied by
substantive protection in its own right, it will remain merely a citation.
This is not to say that there are not many shared experiences that affect both
non-heterosexual and gender-variant subjects, and, of course,many individuals
who unite both categories. ‘Homophobia and transphobia are tightly inter-
twined, and … anti-gay bias … often takes the form of violence and discrim-
ination against those who are seen as transgressing gender norms.’97 Likewise,
93 Toonen v Australia [1994] UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 488/1992.
94 McGill, n 28 above, 23.
95 Corrêa, Petchesky and Parker, n 43 above,161.
96 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Japan, 2008, CCPR/C/JPN/CO/5.
See also Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on
Peru, 2012, E/C.12/PER/CO/2-4.
97 S.Minter, ‘Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real About Transgender Inclusion’
in Currah,Minter and Juang (eds), n 14 above, 142.
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sexual orientation and gender identity are not separable concepts in respect of
many identity claims,particularly those localised to cultures in the global South.
However, gender variance often raises rights claims in and of itself which are
specific to gender-variant subjects.Calls to combat discrimination and violence
can be useful to all parties under the umbrella term, all of whom may experi-
ence marginalisations due to their non-normative gender or sexual expression.
However, specific rights claims such as the right to adequate, trans-literate98
healthcare provision, or the ability to change one’s gender on civil status docu-
ments without undergoing involuntary medical interventions, need more par-
ticular attention than can proceed from cursory or token mentions as part of
the larger SOGI category. An example of a United Nations Special Procedure
mandate taking heed of the specific needs of some gender-variant persons is
seen in the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Health following his country
visit to Malaysia in 2014 (it is to be noted that the Rapporteur focuses on the
experience of transgender women in particular in this Report):
84. Malaysia has become one of the few countries where transgender people are
criminalized. Since the 1980s, a series of legislative initiatives, mostly undertaken
under sharia enactments, prohibited ‘cross dressing’ and forced transgender people,
who had historically enjoyed a certain degree of acceptance in society, to go under-
ground. In 1982, a fatwa issued by the National Fatwa Council, prohibited Muslims
from undergoing sex reassignment surgery and since then very few hospitals have
performed such surgery.The National Registration Department does not allow the
gender indicator on identity cards to be changed, and this applies both to Muslims
and non-Muslims.
87. Transgender women also face serious discrimination in public health-care fa-
cilities. They are often associated with sex work, which is a crime, and they are
forcibly tested for HIV/AIDS. They are identified on the basis of their identity
card and, unless they have undergone sex reassignment surgery, are often housed in
male wards where they can be exposed to violence and abuse.The fear of stigma and
discrimination deters transgender women, and other LGBT people, from seeking
health care, with the consequent devastating effects that this can have.99
This particular attention to gender-variant persons is more often seen in the
Reports and practice of the Special Procedures, perhaps owing to their more
specialised mandates. In order for the same attention to emanate from the Treaty
Bodies, it may be necessary to ensure that international human rights law can
disaggregate sexual orientation and gender identity,100 and use the space thereby
created to create a new and more expansive concept of the rights of gender-
diverse communities, to ensure that they do not lose out in the intersections.101
98 ‘Trans-literate’ is used here as an umbrella term, signifying healthcare which is open to, knowl-
edgeable on, and accepting of persons of all gender identities and expressions.
99 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health,Dainius Puras – Addendum – Visit to Malaysia
(19 November - 2 December 2014); A/HRC/29/33/Add.1.
100 McGill, n 28 above, 24.
101 K. Sheill, ‘Losing out in the Intersections: Lesbians, Human Rights, Law and Activism’ (2009)
15 Contemporary Politics 55.
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Normative Westernisation
International human rights law faces difficulties arising from its international
scope and claim to universality. In attempting to address a global population,
the terms of inclusion used in human rights discourse can form exclusionary
boundaries,or unintentionally render some subjects illegible.We need therefore
to challenge and question the categories of human rights discourse, and their
associated exercise of power through their potential for exclusionary definition
of the gender-variant legal subject.
By framing rights-bearing subjects in terms of sexual orientation and gen-
der identity, it is possible that international human rights law is imposing con-
structed and potentially unwelcome norms on queer and gender-variant sub-
jects from non-Western cultural backgrounds. Indeed, although the framing
in this article aims to remain as inclusionary as possible, it must be noted that
‘queer’ and ‘gender-variant’, along with ‘trans,’ are themselves terms formulated
with a Western bias and deployed here by a Western scholar.
International human rights law can at times be said to fall victim to a ‘fixed
and rigid deployment of gender.’102 This leads to an erasure of gender identities
and expressions which lie beyond the margins of discourse, effectively silencing
and ‘disappearing’ them from the conversation on legal recognition of identity.
This fixed and rigid view of gender identity also treats it as a characteristic
which is innate and unitary in the person’s selfhood. This, of course, does not
hold true for all persons of non-normative sexual and gender identities around
the world. For many persons of culturally located genders and sexualities,
the Western categories of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ are too
narrow or restrictive to capture their subjectivity. Similarly, how can arguing
for equality under the banner of ‘transgender rights’ read to an Indian hijra or
a Native American Two-Spirit person, who may not identify as binary male
or female, but equally not fit the Eurocentric transgender narrative? Equally,
how can the traditional ‘wrong body’European narrative – roundly and rightly
decried by many trans and feminist writers103 – account for persons born and
living outside of a Western gender binary paradigm?
Speaking on scholarship in the United States, Juang states that, ‘the danger
of misrepresentation [of non-Western subjects] is compounded by the problem
of taking on an imperialistic approach to political and intellectual work.’104 To
combat this,Corrêa et al challenge us to locate the human identity in ‘the poor,
black Brazilian travesti’s body … the transgender migrant sex worker … or the
102 Cossman, n 11 above, 800.
103 For example T.M. Bettcher, ‘Trapped in the Wrong Theory:Rethinking Trans Oppression and
Resistance’ (2014) 39 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 383; C. Lester, Trans like
me: A journey for all of us (London: Virago Press: 2017); S. Davidmann, ‘Beyond Borders: Lived
Experience of Atypically Gendered People’ in S.Hines and T. Sanger (eds),Transgender Identities:
Toward a Social Analysis of Gender Diversity (Abingdon,New York,NY:Routledge: 2010).
104 Juang, n 79 above, 256.
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intersex body’105 – to disrupt the narrative of the cisgender heterosexual White
person as standard. They ask, in effect, for the sexual subaltern to speak.106
In seeking to support the rights-claims of gender-variant subjects in the
global South, it is imperative that human rights law does not replicate the colo-
nial project by imposing norms on them. An instructive example lies in the
Human Rights Committee’s 2017 review of Bangladesh, which notes
stigmatization,harassment and violence against lesbian,gay,bisexual and transgender
persons,barriers to assistance in seeking employment of ‘hijras’,who are considered
as transgender persons, by the administration of invasive and humiliating medical
examinations to prove transgender status.107
Hijras are persons usually male-assigned at birth or exhibiting intersex char-
acteristics, whose gender identity is binary-identified female, transfeminine, or
third-gender.108 Some are celibate, but many are sexually active with male part-
ners, and the non-normative sexuality inherent in that activity also forms a
component of the identity. Many do not identify as ‘transgender.’ However, a
growing sector of the gender-variant population in South Asian societies are
young persons who find ‘transgender’, as it is read in a Eurocentric fashion,
both personally resonant and a juridically legible identity category on which
to advocate for rights.109 Defining both communities as ‘transgender’, as the
Human Rights Committee did, is unintentionally exclusionary and does not
allow ‘the subversive potential of [non-Western] gender outlaws and their dis-
cursively produced erotically charged bodies’110 to shape the character of the
international laws through which they are subjectivated.111
CONCLUSION
This article illustrates how the emergence of variant gender identities into
mainstream United Nations human rights discourse has forced the interna-
tional human rights law bodies to expand their definitions of the gendered
subject. International human rights law, and in particular the United Nations
human rights treaty bodies and Special Procedures, has historically provided
a platform on which the rights of minority groups could be represented and
105 Corrêa, Petchesky and Parker, n 43 above, 205.
106 R.Kapur, ‘Law and the Sexual Subaltern: A Comparative Perspective’ (2000) 48 Cleveland State
Law Review 15.
107 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Bangladesh, 2017,
CCPR/C/BGD/CO/1.
108 See G. Reddy,With Respect to Sex: Negotiating Hijra Identity in South India (New Delhi: Yoda
Press, 2006).
109 See G. Reddy, ‘Crossing “Lines” of Subjectivity: Transnational Movements and Gay Identifica-
tions’ in Reddy ibid, 211.
110 Cossman, n 11 above, 802.
111 It is important to note that this may not be entirely the fault of the Human Rights Committee:
they may be mirroring State- or NGO-based terminology submitted to them. Nevertheless, it
is worth noting, as the actions and the jurisprudence of UN Committees can have important
normative effects.
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upheld.The review of states’ compliance with their international human rights
law obligations also allows for open criticism of unfair, discriminatory, or illegal
state practice.This oversight also makes international human rights law a useful
tool for activists and advocates for marginalised communities or those living in
particularly restrictive States.
The CEDAW Convention established a differently gendered subject in the
legal mainstream and consolidated the place of women in international human
rights law, although scholars have latterly problematised the manner in which
CEDAW challenges male/female hierarchies, but leaves in place an assumed
male/female binary gender separation. The adoption of the non-binding but
highly influential Yogyakarta Principles in 2007 proved to be another moment
of rupture for gender in international human rights law.The Principles were the
first document that acknowledged that gender identity did not exist in a pure
binary form, and they gave human rights law a working definition of gender
identity on which claims to rights could be based.This was a paradigm shift for
international human rights law,and the increase in references to gender identity
at the United Nations Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures from 2007/2008
onwards is testament to the impact of the Yogyakarta Principles.
However, the Yogyakarta Principles were not without their own problems.
The definition of ‘gender identity’ given in the Principles has itself been prob-
lematised for its quasi-essentialist nature, and it can be argued that the wholesale
adoption of the terminology,‘sexual orientation and gender identity,’by the UN
Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures has proved to be something of a blunt
legal instrument in the discussion of marginalised and variant gender identities.
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